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Commentary and Reply
On “Rightsizing the Army in Austere Times”
George M. Schwartz

This commentary responds to Charles Hornick, Daniel Burkhart, and Dave Shunk’s
article “Rightsizing the Army in Austere Times” published in the Autumn 2016 issue
of Parameters (vol. 46, no. 3).

I

t is hard to argue with Hornick, Burkhart, and Shunk’s proposition
that the world is a very dangerous place, and to hedge against strategic
risks, the United States needs a larger and more capable army than
what is currently planned. But despite ending up with the almost indisputable conclusion that the US Army requires a larger active force, their
analysis is deeply flawed in two ways. As a result, they miss other viable
options for hedging against strategic risks.
First, the authors fail to address the costs of building a larger active
force in austere times. Sustainable military spending is fundamental to
our nation’s future prosperity and national security. Increases in our
federal spending—whether for military or domestic programs—add to
the national debt and the deficit. Increasing debt burden slows economic
growth, reduces family income levels, and ultimately harms our national
security posture. While the authors point out the joint force is smaller
than it was during the Cold War, they do not mention the Department
of Defense budget is now larger than it was during that period. Most
of current defense spending does go to major weapons systems for the
Navy and the Air Force, but an increase in the active duty Army would
come at a cost as well.
The second and greater failing of the article is what appears to be
a profound lack of understanding of the roles of the Army National
Guard and the Army Reserve and their contributions to the total Army.
On the first page, the Guard and Reserve are described as “strategic
reserves” and then they are essentially left out of the remainder of the
article. This omission undermines the authors’ argument in three ways.
First of all, the National Guard and the Reserve are not strategic
reserves. The service’s capstone document Army Doctrine Publication
1, The Army, recognizes the significant operational contributions of
the National Guard and the Reserve over the past 15 years and defines
these components as the Army’s operational reserve. While the reserve
components certainly provide the Army with strategic depth, they
comprise more than half of the total Army; therefore, any discussion of
structuring for operations must acknowledge this fact.
The authors proceed to analyze five assumptions they submit to
be faulty, one of which is that the Army can rapidly generate required
ground forces. This points to the second issue: the authors appear to
believe the assumption is faulty because the only method they consider
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for generating required ground forces is expansion—to start from
scratch and build a new regular Army unit to meet additional requirements. Twice in the article they make the point that building an armored
brigade combat team takes at least 32 months. While undoubtedly true,
they make no reference to the five Army National Guard armored
brigade combat teams. Would mobilizing one of these teams not be
more efficient and effective than building, training, and equipping a
new one?
Finally, the authors repeatedly fail to acknowledge reserve components already contribute to Army operations therefore reducing the
requirements for the regular Army; for example, references are made
to the 5,000 soldiers in Kuwait and Iraq, and the Army’s ongoing
commitment to North Atlantic Treaty Organization missions without
any acknowledgement that many of the troops on these missions are
mobilized citizen soldiers. In fact, the US Army mission in Kosovo is
conducted almost entirely by reserve component soldiers, and two Guard
division headquarters are currently deployed on missions overseas.
Rightsizing is a process for restructuring an organization for business
conditions. When done right, it involves a creative mix of outsourcing,
partnerships, contractors, and full- and part-time employees to optimize
operating costs. While elements of readiness are deferred until mobilization, reserve component forces are estimated to cost about one third of
the active equivalent to regularly maintain. Therefore, a better approach
to rightsizing the Army’s operational force is not simply to find a “sweet
spot” number of regular Army personnel but to create a mix of active,
mobilized reserve, and reserve units postured appropriately for the
contemporary requirements.
In 1940, sensing that the United States might be drawn into World
War II, President Roosevelt activated more than 300,000 guardsmen for
training, doubling the size of the Army’s active force. After the Pearl
Harbor attack, the first Army infantry regiment and division to attack
the Japanese were from the National Guard. At the same time, Reserve
officers and noncommissioned officers helped form the cadre of new
“draftee divisions” that would soon join the fight. The Chief of Staff of
the Army, General Mark A. Milley, has made it clear that discussions
regarding the Army force structure cannot be done without considering
the Guard and Reserve. Undoubtedly, he recalls how this precedent of
using the total force helped win the war.

The Authors Reply
Charles Hornick, Daniel Burkhart, and Dave Shunk

T

he authors appreciate the comments provided by BG Schwartz
and agree, but reiterate that the roles, missions, and sizing [of the
Guard and Reserve] were “beyond the scope and length” of their
article, which focused on the “size of the active duty Army” (41).

